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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1557  
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1760  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1772  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1789  
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1416  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUCPDO/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY  
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STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR,  
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WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2018  
TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [CWC](#)  
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): RUSSIAN  
DESTRUCTION FACILITY DOCUMENTS

REF: STATE 058096

Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Javits for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

This is CWC-26-08.

11. (U) This is an action message -- see para 7 below.

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SUMMARY  
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12. (C) On June 3, U.S. Del began a series of meetings to gauge initial reactions to the strategy laid out in reftel for approval of U.S. and Russian destruction documents. Reactions from Russia seemed favorable, but do not preclude a harder line from Moscow in the coming weeks. The Close Allies were favorably disposed to the idea of making progress at EC-53, although not all seemed convinced that the approach outlined would be successful. Ambassador Javits will meet with the Director General at the earliest opportunity to ascertain his views and possible approach for the upcoming Executive Council session.

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INITIAL RUSSIAN REACTION  
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13. (C) On June 3, Ambassador Javits and DelRep met with Russian Ambassador Gevorgian and Deputy Gavrilov to discuss the possibilities for mutual agreement of U.S. and Russian facility agreements and verification plans at EC-53. Despite rumors to the contrary, Amb. Gevorgian did not seem to think there were political obstacles in Moscow to agreeing to the technical changes (to the Maradykovsky documents) proposed by the Technical Secretariat, and seemed hopeful that the changes could be finalized during the TS visit to Moscow next week. Amb. Javits noted that these changes, and Russian approval of the U.S. Newport and Pine Bluff Binary documents were absolutely necessary for U.S. approval of Maradykovsky and Leonidovka.

¶4. (C) Amb. Javits also explained that the U.S. would document its view of the definition of the "end point of destruction" for the record, and seek appropriate report language recalling the arrangement described by the Director General in his EC-49 statement. DelRep noted that Newport changes should be available no later than June 4, and that Washington would likely be open to considering Russian amendments even shortly before the EC if the same courtesy were extended on the U.S. revisions. Gavrilov noted that Moscow would need time to study them, but seemed hopeful that the expected time frame would be adequate.

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INITIAL REACTION FROM THE CLOSE ALLIES  
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¶5. (C) On June 3, Amb. Javits and DelReps met with UK Amb. Parker and other representatives of the British, French and German delegations to share the U.S. proposed approach. The reaction was generally favorable, although delegations had a number of questions. Germany questioned how other delegations would react to a possibly late distribution of the Maradykovsky changes, and there was agreement that some preparatory work might be necessary to ensure other delegations did not allow a procedural reaction to block significant progress on the documents. Germany also expressed some desire that a commitment to two stage destruction under Article IV should still be sought. However, France and the UK noted their views that the practical commitment to verification of the entire process was far more important. Finally, Germany asked what the U.S.

approach would be if Russia refused to agree to report language or the U.S. documents.

¶6. (C) Amb. Javits explained that his national statement would lay out the U.S. views on the subject, and asked for feedback from others as to how they viewed their own role in the process. Although there was little response to this question, the UK suggested that instead of recalling the DG's EC-49 statement, it would be more relevant (and beneficial) for the DG to include an updated version of the concept expressed at EC-49 in his EC-53 statement. Amb. Javits agreed to discuss this in a meeting later in the week with the DG. After some discussion of what level of support, vocal or otherwise, would be most likely to facilitate approval of both sets of documents, France suggested that the EU statement could include appropriate language. The allies also requested an early look at any statement the U.S. would make on this matter. In closing, delegations expressed appreciation for this early meeting, which gave time for capitals to consider the issue before the June 17 London meeting.

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ACTION REQUESTED  
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¶7. (SBU) Based on these initial discussions, Ambassador Javits strongly prefers that the U.S. outline of our position on the end point of destruction be in the national statement rather than a national paper. Del will begin drafting that statement immediately and would therefore appreciate any suggested points to be included.

¶8. (U) Javits sends.  
Gallagher